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THE LEARNING PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION:  
HOW CHINESE LAW FIRMS SURVIVED THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Xueyao Li* & Sida Liu**
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China 
has become a prime location for the global expansion of legal services.  
More than a hundred international law firms have established offices in 
major Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai,1 and a number of 
Chinese corporate law firms have become important players in foreign 
investments, public listings, and other cross-border transactions.2
As it did elsewhere,
  Until the 
financial crisis hit in 2008, most practitioners and observers of the Chinese 
legal service market expected this rapid growth to continue for at least 
another five to ten years, with law firms getting bigger, becoming more 
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Unless otherwise indicated, the interviews cited in this Essay were conducted on a 
confidential basis by those noted.  The authors have confirmed the accuracy of the 
interviewees’ statements, which have been lightly edited by the Fordham Law Review. 
 the global financial crisis changed the Chinese 
corporate legal market in many ways.  Given the Chinese economy’s 
resilience, one may wonder to what extent Chinese law firms suffered.  
Using data from empirical research conducted in Shanghai during the 
summer of 2009, this Essay examines the crisis’s impact on law firms in 
China.  It argues that, theoretically, the globalization of the legal profession 
is not a process of institutional diffusion, but a creative learning process 
where law firms in emergent economies are both receivers of global 
**  Assistant Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Research 
Fellow, Shanghai Jiao Tong University KoGuan Law School. 
 1. See Sida Liu, Globalization as Boundary-Blurring:  International and Local Law 
Firms in China’s Corporate Law Market, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771, 778 (2008); Carole 
Silver, Local Matters:  Internationalizing Strategies for U.S. Law Firms, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 67, 79–80 (2007). 
 2. Sida Liu, Client Influence and the Contingency of Professionalism:  The Work of 
Elite Corporate Lawyers in China, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 751, 764 (2006). 
 3. See John P. Heinz, When Law Firms Fail, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 74–75 (2009). 
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structural forms and expertise, and innovators in creating new models of 
law firm management for the twenty-first century. 
Theorizing globalization as a creative learning process implies moving 
away from the Anglo-American-centric perspective of institutional 
diffusion and isomorphism4 to a global perspective of institutional learning 
through mutual interaction between global and local actors at the boundary 
of nation-states.5  For theories of law and globalization,6 the case of China 
is both unique and instructive.  The managerial strategies used by Chinese 
law firms to deal with the 2008 financial crisis were driven by local market 
and political demands, making them distinct from those used by many 
Anglo-American law firms.  It is likely that, in the post-crisis global legal 
services market, law firms in China and other emergent economies, such as 
India, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, will play a large role in market 
development and institutional innovation.  Together with an earlier article 
that focused on the production of localized expertise at the global-local 
boundary,7
This Essay begins with an organizational history of Chinese law firms 
since their privatization in the 1990s.  Next, drawing on interviews with 
lawyers in a variety of Chinese law firms,
 this Essay investigates this mutual and creative learning process 
in the globalization of the legal profession. 
8
I.  LAW FIRM EVOLUTION IN CHINA:  
FROM PRIVATIZATION TO GLOBALIZATION 
 it analyzes the changes in 
business composition, client relations, and career trajectory in the Shanghai 
bar during the global financial crisis.  The analysis demonstrates the various 
ways that Chinese law firms changed from receivers of global structure and 
producers of localized expertise during rapid market growth to creative 
innovators in a global economic downturn. 
Until the late 1980s, all Chinese law firms were state-owned; all lawyers 
were state employees on the government payroll.9
 
 4. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 
(2000); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:  INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
(1996); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & 
Paul J. Dimaggio eds., 1991); Elizabeth H. Boyle & John W. Meyer, Modern Law as a 
Secularized and Global Model:  Implications for the Sociology of Law, 49 SOZIALE WELT 
213, 220 (1998) (Ger.); Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity of Global Normmaking:  A 
Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 263 (2009). 
  When the legal 
 5. See generally GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS:  THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND 
IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOX (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002); 
Liu, supra note 1; Silver, supra note 1. 
 6. See generally Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 447 (2006). 
 7. Liu, supra note 1, at 781–82. 
 8. Due to administrative limitations on the scope of our fieldwork, we could not 
conduct interviews with lawyers in foreign law offices. 
 9. See Sida Liu, Lawyers, State Officials and Significant Others:  Symbiotic Exchange 
in the Chinese Legal Services Market, 206 CHINA Q. 276, 281–82 (2011) (U.K.); Ethan 
Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China’s 
Transition from Socialism, 113 AM. J. SOC. 352, 353 (2007). 
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profession was revived after the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), legal 
service agencies were called “legal advisory divisions” (falü guwen chu) 
instead of law firms.  In July 1983, Shekou District Law Firm was founded 
in Shenzhen,10 a city adjacent to Hong Kong and one of the five special 
economic zones on the southeast coast.  It became the first legal service 
agency with the title “law firm” (lüshi shiwusuo) since China’s economic 
reform.  In August 1984, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) decided in its 
national work conference to change the official title of “legal advisory 
division” to “law firm” across the country.  By 1988, there were 3,473 law 
firms in China, with 31,410 lawyers in total and 21,051 full-time lawyers.11 
Because few foreign investors were willing to retain state-owned local 
law firms for business negotiations with Chinese enterprises, foreign 
investment remained undeveloped.  Additionally, although a limited 
number of foreign lawyers played an active role in international business 
transactions in the first decade of China’s market reform,12 foreign law 
firms were not permitted to establish offices in mainland China. 
The watershed moment in the evolution of Chinese law firms occurred 
around 1988–89, when the MOJ began experimenting with a new 
organizational form, the “cooperative law firm” (hezuo lüshi shiwusuo), in a 
few major cities such as Beijing and Shenzhen.13  Cooperative law firms 
had different ownership and management models than state-owned firms.  
They were collectively owned and managed by all the lawyers in the firm, 
and the state neither owned nor funded them.14  Instead, the firm’s lawyers 
followed the “Two Nos and Four Selves” (liang bu si zi) principle, i.e., no 
administrative personnel, no state funding, self-finance, self-debt, self-
development, and self-regulation.  While they were not partnerships 
because China did not, at the time, recognize private ownership, they were, 
in a sense, a transitional form used during the privatization of the Chinese 
legal profession. 
The primary objective behind privatization was to gain global legitimacy 
and signal to foreign governments and investors that China had a modern 
legal profession that was relatively autonomous from the party-state.15  But 
shortly after the cooperative law firm experiment began, the 1989 
Tiananmen student movement broke out, causing large-scale withdrawal of 
foreign capital from mainland China.16  In 1992, as part of the 
government’s effort to convince foreign investors to return, the MOJ 
officially permitted twelve firms—two from the United Kingdom, one from 
 
 10. Firm Profile, SHEKOU L. FIRM, http://www.justelites.com/en/about.asp (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2012). 
 11. CHINA LAW YEARBOOK (1989). 
 12. Liu, supra note 1, at 777. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Measure for Cooperative Law Firms (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, 
Nov. 25, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Jan. 15, 1997, at 1576 (China); 
Pilot Program for Cooperative Law Firms (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, June 3, 
1988, effective June 3, 1988) (China) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 15. See Liu, supra note 1, at 777. 
 16. See id. 
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France, one from the United States, and eight from Hong Kong (at the time 
not returned to China)—to open “representative offices.”17  Following this, 
the number of international law offices in China grew steadily throughout 
the 1990s.18
Due to Chinese government regulations, the Chinese offices of 
international law firms operated differently than their offices in other 
countries.  They could neither “interpret Chinese law,” nor “employ 
licensed Chinese lawyers,”
 
19 and thus needed to collaborate with domestic 
law firms to provide legal opinions to their clients or to appear in court.  
While this barrier on transnational law practice created a heavy burden for 
foreign law firms seeking to enter the Chinese market, it was a blessing for 
domestic corporate law firms.  A few cooperative law firms in Beijing and 
Shanghai started specializing in foreign-related corporate work, and 
obtained work from foreign law firms as a result.20
In the mid-1990s, the privatization of Chinese law firms entered its 
second stage.  After the promulgation of the 1997 Lawyers Law
  Although they 
performed relatively simple tasks, such as signing legal documents that 
their foreign colleagues drafted, it was a major step for these new Chinese 
corporate law firms. 
21 and 
increased guidance from relevant MOJ policies, the majority of state-owned 
and cooperative law firms in urban China reorganized into partnership law 
firms in less than five years.22  The Lawyers Law created a partnership 
structure similar to partnerships in other countries, with all partners 
assuming unlimited and joint liability for the firm’s debts and obligations.23  
However, the MOJ did not approve solo practitioners.  Thus, the 
“partnership” among Chinese lawyers was compulsory, rather than a 
voluntary organizational entity.  Most partners “ate what they killed,”24 
rarely working together or referring business to each other.25
During the 1990s, many Chinese nationals with extensive legal training 
and experience in foreign countries, such as the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Germany, France, and Japan, returned to China and became 
partners in domestic law firms.  In the process, they brought extensive 
knowledge in handling complex corporate projects, such as foreign direct 
 
 
 17. Announcement, China Ministry of Justice, Notice on Granting Twelve Foreign 
(Outside) Law Firms Including Coudert Brothers to Establish Representative Offices in the 
Mainland (1992) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 18. Liu, supra note 1, at 777–79. 
 19. Interim Provisions on the Establishment of Offices Within the Territory of China by 
Foreign Law Firms (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, State Indus. & Commerce 
Admin., May 26, 1992, effective May 26, 1992) (China). 
 20. Liu, supra note 2, at 758–59. 
 21. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 15, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), art. 18 (Lawinfochina) 
[hereinafter Law on Lawyers]. 
 22. Liu, supra note 9, at 283; Michelson, supra note 9, at 371–74. 
 23. Law on Lawyers, art. 18. 
 24. Ethan Michelson, The Practice of Law as an Obstacle to Justice:  Chinese Lawyers 
at Work, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 11 (2006). 
 25. Liu, supra note 1, at 787. 
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investment (FDI) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  Accordingly, a 
few leading Chinese corporate law firms began performing substantive 
work when collaborating with foreign law firms.  By the turn of the century, 
when privatization culminated in a nationwide “unhooking and privatizing” 
(tuogou gaizhi) campaign,26 the largest Chinese law firms already 
employed over 100 lawyers, and had established multiple offices in 
China,27
In 2001, after more than a decade of persistent effort, China joined the 
WTO.
 along with satellite offices in New York and Silicon Valley. 
28  As part of the agreement enabling China’s WTO entry, China 
agreed to further open up its market for legal services.  That same year, the 
State Council promulgated new regulations on foreign law offices.  While 
still forbidding them from handling Chinese legal affairs, the new 
regulations allowed them to “provide [advice to their clients] on the 
influences to [the] Chinese legal environment.”29  These ambiguous 
regulations created a gray area for the practice of foreign law firms in 
China.  Rather than collaborate with major domestic firms, many firms 
began using filing companies or so-called “puppet firms” (i.e., domestic law 
firms doing rubber-stamp work for foreign firms) when providing written 
legal opinions to their clients.30
The years after China’s WTO entry marked the golden age for the 
development of the Chinese corporate legal market.  The number of foreign 
and Hong Kong law offices increased from 133 in 2002 to 203 in 2006, and 
many existing offices also doubled or tripled in size.
 
31  Several leading 
international firms established offices in both Beijing and Shanghai, and 
began planning to expand to other major Chinese cities such as Guangzhou 
or Chengdu.  If not for a MOJ restriction that only permitted foreign law 
firms to establish one new office in China every three years,32
The massive growth of international law firms created many job 
opportunities for both Chinese and foreign lawyers working in the corporate 
sector.  With this came a shift in the direction of personnel movement 
between foreign and domestic law firms.  During the 1990s, foreign law 
offices rarely hired lawyers from domestic firms, instead hiring lawyers 
with overseas training and experience, or hiring graduates from elite 
Chinese law schools that they could train.  Meanwhile, because the foreign 
law offices that hired Chinese associates rarely placed them on a 
 the number 
of branch offices would have been even greater. 
 
 26. Michelson, supra note 9, at 371–74; see also Liu, supra note 9, at 283. 
 27. See Liu, supra note 1, at 778. 
 28. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 10 November 2001, Accession of 
the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (2001). 
 29. Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Law Firms’ Representative Offices in 
China (promulgated by the St. Council of the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 22, 2001, 
effective Jan. 1, 2002), art. 15 (Lawinfochina). 
 30. Liu, supra note 1, at 782–83. 
 31. Id. at 778. 
 32. Provisions of the Ministry of Justice on the Execution of the Regulations on the 
Administration of Foreign Law Firms’ Representative Offices in China (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Justice, July 4, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002), art. 10 (Lawinfochina). 
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partnership track, many senior associates returned to domestic firms to 
become partners.33
This changed in the early 2000s when foreign law offices, especially 
newly established ones, began hiring a large number of lawyers from 
domestic firms.  This was partly due to their urgent, expansion-related 
needs.  Moreover, as Chinese law became increasingly complex, and 
government control on foreign capital remained strong, experience in top 
Chinese firms became an increasingly valuable commodity.  This was not 
simply the “local know-who” that Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth discuss 
in the case of Latin America,
 
34 but a hybrid expertise produced in the 
workplaces of domestic law firms.35  Consequently, several elite domestic 
firms in Beijing and Shanghai lost a significant number of lawyers, 
particularly mid-level and senior associates, to foreign law offices.36  In 
April 2006, the Shanghai Lawyers Association issued a news brief that 
publicly condemned the illegal behavior of foreign law firms in employing 
Chinese lawyers.37
Despite the aggressive behavior of some foreign law firms, the justice 
bureaus did not attempt to enforce the MOJ regulation, rendering it 
meaningless.
 
38  In most situations, Chinese lawyers working at foreign law 
offices simply stopped registering their lawyer licenses to avoid 
government sanction, while at the same time keeping their professional 
certification so that they could get a new license if they decided to return to 
a domestic firm.  The MOJ did not actively enforce its rules because any 
substantive sanctions on foreign law firms would have hampered efforts to 
attract foreign investment into China.39
While the number of foreign law offices in China grew exponentially in 
the mid-2000s, most of them remained relatively small offices.  Meanwhile, 
Chinese corporate law firms, particularly those in Beijing, grew 
substantially.  In 2002, only a handful of Chinese law firms had more than 
100 lawyers,
  Given the rapid changes in the 
legal services market, the MOJ’s approach was likely a more flexible and 
realistic strategy for professional regulation. 
40 but in 2011, at least a dozen of them had more than 200 
lawyers, with the largest, Dacheng Law Offices, employing more than 
2,000 lawyers in thirty-five offices in China and seven offices abroad.41
 
 33. See Liu, supra note 
  
King & Wood, the second largest Chinese law firm, has established fifteen 
1, at 789–93. 
 34. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE 
WARS:  LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 
49 (2002). 
 35. Liu, supra note 1, at 774–75. 
 36. Id. at 792. 
 37. News Brief, Shanghai Lawyers Ass’n, The Situation of Illegal Business Activities 
Practiced by Foreign Law Firms in Shanghai Is Severe (Apr. 17, 2006) (on file with the 
Fordham Law Review). 
 38. Liu, supra note 1, at 795–801. 
 39. Id. at 798–99. 
 40. Liu, supra note 2, at 757. 
 41. See About Dacheng, DACHENG L. OFFICES, http://www.dachengnet.com/en/about/
index.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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offices in different parts of China, and also maintains offices in New York, 
Tokyo, and Silicon Valley.42
Elite Chinese law firms shifted their management style as they increased 
in size.  The traditional “eat what you kill” model was gradually replaced 
with the bureaucratic model, in which the firm is formally divided into 
several specialized departments, two or three tiers of partners, and a 
management committee that has ultimate decision-making authority.
 
43  The 
power structure is not uniform among the firms:  some are more democratic 
and all equity partners share power; others, despite their large size, are 
controlled by a small number of founding or influential partners.44
In 2007, China revised its Lawyers Law to permit “sole proprietorship 
law firms.”  A “sole proprietorship law firm” is similar to the solo practice 
seen in Western countries, but the law firm director must have at least five 
years of practice experience, and the director may employ other lawyers.
  
Nevertheless, elite Chinese law firms are beginning to adopt management 
styles similar to that of their Western counterparts. 
45
The revised Lawyers Law also added a “specialized general partnership” 
(teshu putong hehuo) form, which is similar to the limited liability 
partnership (LLP) model widely used in transnational law practice.
  
Most sole proprietorship law firms established in recent years have more 
than one licensed lawyer; the main difference between them and partnership 
law firms is the firm’s ownership structure, not the number of lawyers.  
Meanwhile, the transitional form of the cooperative law firm was abolished.  
As a result, since 2008, state-owned law firms, partnership law firms, and 
sole proprietorship law firms have become the three legal forms for law 
firm organization in China. 
46  In 
such a partnership, partners with fault or negligence assume unlimited 
liability for the firm’s debts, while other partners only assume limited 
liability according to their investment in the partnership.  In November 
2009, Dacheng Law Offices officially adopted the new model.47
 
 42. See The Firm, KING & WOOD, http://www.kingandwood.com/thefirm.aspx?
language=en (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
  The 
introduction of the LLP model to China symbolizes the final step in 
Chinese law firms’ structural convergence to the global norms in law firm 
management. 
 43. EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON:  THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF 
COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP (2001); ROBERT L. 
NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:  THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 
(1988); ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER:  PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 
(1964). 
 44. Liu, supra note 2, at 759–60. 
 45. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective June 1, 2008), art. 16 (Lawinfochina). 
 46. Id. at art. 15. 
 47. Zhang Qingshui, Beijing Dacheng Law Firm Was Granted the Privilege to Become 
the First Special General Partnership Law Firm in Beijing, CHINA LEGAL DAILY (Nov. 20, 
2009), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2009-11/20/content_1184867.
htm. 
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By rapidly expanding, large Chinese corporate law firms diversified their 
practice areas and became more resistant to collaboration and potential 
mergers with foreign firms maintaining an active presence in China.  Many 
international law offices, especially the lower-tier firms, now view the 
largest Chinese firms as formidable competitors in FDI, M&A, and other 
corporate transactions.48
In January 2007, Chicago-headquartered McDermott Will & Emery 
(McDermott) opened an office in Shanghai.
  However, not all Chinese firms are attempting 
rapid expansion and becoming generalists; a number of boutique firms, 
particularly firms in Shanghai, have remained relatively small and 
specialize in only one or two areas of practice, such as initial public 
offerings (IPOs) or venture capital projects.  While these boutique firms 
usually maintain a good working relationship with foreign firms, they face 
increasing pressure from large generalist domestic firms.  In recent years, 
several boutique firms have either merged with, or lost a large number of 
partners to, their larger competitors. 
49
Large Chinese law firms are also becoming increasingly ambitious in 
their global reach.  In July 2011, King & Wood began discussing a strategic 
alliance with Mallesons Stephen Jaques, one Australia’s largest and most 
prominent law firms.
  This office was, however, 
fundamentally different from other foreign law offices in China.  It was 
established as an independent Chinese law firm (Yuan Da Law Offices) that 
maintained an exclusive strategic alliance with McDermott.  All of 
McDermott’s China projects will be conducted through this office, but 
McDermott cannot officially share the profits of the office.  The two 
founding partners of the McDermott China office were senior partners in 
Allbright, the largest Chinese law firm in Shanghai.  The McDermott China 
office is still operating today, and as of yet there have been no attempted 
government sanctions.  This “hybrid” law office model presents a strong 
challenge to the MOJ’s restrictions on foreign law offices, and it will be 
intriguing to observe if other international law firms adopt this hybrid 
model in the near future. 
50  Partners in both firms approved the tie-up in 
December 2011,51 and the new law firm, King & Wood Mallesons, was 
established on March 1, 2012.52
 
 48. Liu, supra note 
  In contrast to its cautious restrictions on 
the expansion of foreign law offices in China, the MOJ was apparently 
supportive of King & Wood’s effort to go global, and it remains to be seen 
1, at 780–84. 
 49. Nathan Koppel & Andrew Batson, A U.S. Law Firm Takes a New Route into China, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at B1. 
 50. Anthony Lin, King & Wood, Mallesons Discussing Chinese-Aussie Alliance, AM. 
LAW. (July 21, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202504242639. 
 51. Suzhi Ring, King & Wood Partners Seal Mallesons Tie-Up; New Firm to Go Live 
Next Year, LAW.COM (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/
LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202534561136&slreturn=1. 
 52. Gillian Tan, King & Wood Mallesons Now in Business, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. AUSTL. 
(Mar. 2, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/dealjournalaustralia/2012/03/02/march-
merger-madness/. 
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whether other major Chinese law firms will follow King & Wood’s 
example. 
Overall, evolution of law firms in China from the 1980s to the 2000s was 
a process of global convergence and structural diversification, in which the 
privatization of Chinese law firms and the expansion of foreign law offices 
were the two main themes of transformation.  Foreign law firms faced 
significant barriers in collaborating with Chinese law firms and employing 
Chinese lawyers, but their entrance and expansion into the corporate legal 
market also accelerated the transformation of domestic law firms from 
small, state-owned firms to large and sophisticated partnerships.  Before the 
financial crisis hit the Chinese legal services market in 2008, competition 
between foreign and domestic law firms was fierce and extensive, and the 
MOJ faced increasing pressure to balance China’s demands for foreign 
capital with its protection of the nascent domestic legal profession. 
II.  AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:  THE CASE OF SHANGHAI 
How did the 2008 global financial crisis impact law firms in China?  
How did the crisis change the business model of Chinese law firms and 
their relationship with foreign law offices?  We approached these questions 
by conducting in-depth interviews with forty-two lawyers and law firm 
managerial staff at thirteen law firms in Shanghai, China’s primary 
commercial center.  We jointly designed the interviews in June 2009, and 
Xueyao Li and his research assistant conducted the interviews between July 
15 and September 10, 2009.  Because the Shanghai Lawyers Association, 
which has regulatory authority only over domestic law firms, funded this 
research, foreign law offices were not included in our fieldwork.  
Nevertheless, we were able to collect information about their practices from 
Chinese law firms collaborating with them. 
We classified law firms in Shanghai into five categories according to the 
numbers of licensed lawyers at the firms:  1–3 lawyers; 4–15 lawyers; 16–
30 lawyers; 31–50 lawyers; and 50 or more lawyers.  The thirteen law firms 
selected included firms in each of the five categories.  We included a few 
more firms from the last category because they perform a large amount of 
corporate work, and thus the financial crisis probably affected them the 
most.  The interviews were primarily conducted in the lawyers’ offices on 
an individual basis, but we also conducted a few group interviews with 
multiple participants.  A small proportion of the interviews were conducted 
in coffee shops or teahouses per request of the interviewees.  For each law 
firm, we conducted at least two interviews:  one with the firm’s managing 
partner or a senior partner, and the other with an associate at the firm. 
All the interview questions were designed to be semi-structured and 
open-ended.  With the administrative support of the Shanghai Lawyers 
Association, most interviews went smoothly, and the interviewees were 
cooperative and provided candid answers to our questions.  The diversity of 
our interview pool enabled us to perform detailed analyses, and to provide a 
general assessment of the current status of the Shanghai bar and the impact 
of the 2008 financial crisis.  In the following three sections, we discuss in 
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detail how different types of Chinese law firms adapted their client 
relations, management models, and individual careers in 2008 and 2009. 
A.  Business Decline and Fluctuation 
Overall, the impact of the financial crisis on the Shanghai bar was 
substantial in degree, but limited in scale.  The economic downturn hit 
corporate firms serving foreign clients the hardest, while only slightly 
affecting mid-size and small law firms specializing in litigation and those 
that served local and individual clients.  Some large generalist corporate law 
firms did not see any significant reduction in their total revenue.  The 
managing partner of a large generalist law firm, discussing the firm’s 
performance in the first half of 2009, explained: 
The financial crisis did not have any big impact on the total revenue of 
our firm.  By July of [2009], the Shanghai office had a total billing of 136 
million [yuan], 19 million more than the same period [in 2008].  The total 
billings of all our offices were around 180–200 million [yuan].  So in 
terms of the total revenue, no impact from the financial crisis was seen.  
Of course, without the impact of the financial crisis, the increase in the 
amount of billings would have been greater, and the growth would have 
been more significant.53
Arguably, beneath the steady increase in total revenue are fluctuations in 
the amount of work across different legal fields before and after the 
financial crisis.  In many corporate law firms, work in fields such as FDI, 
M&A, IPOs, and outbound investments dropped significantly, while 
bankruptcy and litigation work increased slightly.  Firms also took on more 
work from domestic clients than before, as projects from foreign clients 
decreased and collaborations with foreign law offices became less frequent. 
 
Law firm partners were particularly concerned with the sharp decline in 
FDI and IPO work because those areas were their most profitable.  The 
managing partner quoted above acknowledged: 
The biggest impact on us was in non-litigation work.  First, after 
September 16[, 2008], IPOs in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong mostly stopped, and we also had no projects 
to handle.  Second, M&As were greatly affected too.  Since [2008] FDI 
has stopped—the financial crisis had the greatest impact in this area.  
Many corporations withdrew their projects and did not invest anymore, 
just watching the economic trend.  Third, the venture capital markets in 
China and abroad have not been good.  The first half of [2009] was tough 
because of the financial crisis.  All these have had major impacts on our 
business.54
Another lawyer, specializing in foreign-related work at a large firm, 
confirmed the changes: 
 
The [greatest] impact of the financial crisis on the legal profession was 
from the second half of [2008] to [2009].  The bigger the law firm, the 
 
 53. Interview of AA by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 11, 2009). 
 54. Id. 
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greater the impact.  The more high-end the business (finance, M&A, etc.), 
the greater the impact.  It was similar to the situation in other countries.  
Project-based businesses were highly affected, almost gone, such as 
overseas IPOs, FDI, M&A, et cetera.55
Billings were also significantly affected.  As foreign companies and local 
enterprises began to rigorously control costs, clients increased demands on 
law firms.  A lawyer specializing in corporate work described this 
phenomenon: 
 
Because of the reduction in the clients’ budgets, they let their in-house 
counsel do the work that they previously outsourced.  For the work that 
needs to be outsourced, they strictly control the cost.  Now they really 
care about the hourly rates of law firms.  Foreign companies, especially 
American companies, would aggressively ask us to reduce their hourly 
rate or to give a 10–20 percent discount.  It was not like this previously.  
This is to say, compared to the situation before the financial crisis, now 
we do the work for one million [yuan], but only get about 800,000 [yuan] 
in billings.56
Smaller boutique firms specializing in foreign-related work had similar 
experiences.  The financial crisis affected these boutique firms more 
because their areas of practice were less diverse than large generalist firms.  
For instance, one boutique firm had a longstanding collaboration with a 
major American bank.  The bank had been in a “vegetative state” since the 
crisis, as a lawyer in the firm put it
 
57—a big blow for the firm’s business.  
In addition to the shortage of new projects, the more frequent use of in-
house counsel, as mentioned in the quote above, contributed to the decline 
of corporate work in law firms.58
Real estate also experienced a sharp drop, mainly because foreign 
investors withdrew significant amounts of capital from the Shanghai real 
estate market during the financial crisis.  However, the impact of the 
financial crisis on the Chinese real estate market was only temporary, as a 
managing partner of a law firm providing financial services to real estate 
companies described: 
 
The lowest point of our business was October and November [2008], but 
it began to recover in December [2008].  Since . . . March [2009] it has 
basically returned to normal, even reaching a new peak. . . .  When the 
crisis hit, our business shrank to only one-third of the highest point.  In 
general, we were profitable in the first half of [2008] and ran a deficit in 
the second half [of 2008].  The deficit was nearly 10 percent of our profit 
[in 2007].59
 
 55. Interview of CA by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 11, 2009). 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Interview of CF by Xueyao Li & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 16, 2009). 
 58. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielson, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:  
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 
470–86 (2000). 
 59. Interview of CF, supra note 57. 
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Even the lower-end corporate work for smaller, local business clients saw 
signs of substantial decline.  Many small private enterprises stopped 
retaining law firms and began to hire, or rely more heavily on, in-house 
counsel.  Some clients stopped retaining large firms and instead used 
smaller firms as outside counsel.  The managing partner of a firm with 
fourteen lawyers reported: 
This financial crisis had a major impact on our clients.  Some [clients] 
stopped retaining lawyers, but the percentage was relatively small.  Some 
asked for lower billing rates.  For some clients, we even voluntarily 
reduced their rates [to keep the business]. . . .  Of course, there were also 
clients who had previously retained prominent lawyers as outside counsel, 
but switched to us, because we were more affordable and had high-quality 
service too.60
In sum, for most areas of corporate work, the negative impact of the 
financial crisis was clearly visible.  Nevertheless, there were also some 
exceptions.  For instance, the Chinese government’s four trillion yuan 
stimulus plan generated a surge in banking and finance work for a few large 
corporate law firms that primarily served domestic clients.
 
61
For smaller firms like ours, the financial crisis had little impact.  In 
litigation work, while the clients’ payments were not as smooth as before 
and they sometimes asked for discounts, there was almost no 
impact. . . .  Our corporate work actually increased.  Of course, it is hard 
to distinguish whether it was corporate work or litigation work.  [The 
work] was generated by litigation, mainly including bankruptcy, labor 
contract, etc.
  Additionally, 
bankruptcy and labor contract work increased for both large and small 
firms.  As a managing partner in a small law firm commented: 
62
Despite this, the majority of lawyers considered the increase in these 
areas merely temporary.  Because the majority of large corporations in 
China are state-owned enterprises,
 
63 the government will not let them fail, 
even in a serious financial crisis.  As for major private enterprises, the 
resilience of the Chinese economy, which maintained an annual GDP 
growth rate of more than 8 percent, protected them from failure.  Thus, 
bankruptcies mostly occurred in small, private enterprises, and did not 
create a large amount of business for corporate law firms.  As the Shanghai 
economy recovered steadily in 2009, bankruptcy work declined.64
Although the global financial crisis still continues, its impact on the 
Shanghai bar has already diminished.  Many lawyers in large corporate 
firms indicated that corporate work in their firms began to recover in the 
 
 
 60. Interview of AA by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 6, 2009). 
 61. Interview of CF, supra note 57; Interview of AA, supra note 53. 
 62. Interview of AA, supra note 60. 
 63. Liu, supra note 2, at 761. 
 64. Interview of CA by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 13, 2009). 
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second quarter of 2009.65  As the stock market increased, domestic and 
overseas IPOs began increasing.  However, most lawyers working in these 
areas indicated that business had not recovered to the level of the pre-crisis 
golden era, with FDI and other foreign-related business not experiencing 
any substantial recovery.  Apparently, this is closely related to the larger 
business environments in the global economy and not limited to China.  
Until the global legal services market fully recovers, it will be difficult for 
Chinese corporate law firms to repeat their rapid growth of the mid-
2000s.66
If we look at the amount of business in June and July [of 2009], it was 
actually higher than [2008].  This is not to say that the financial crisis has 
passed.  Some increase was simply [because of] a resurgence of the 
market.  The economic conditions were bad last year, and many IPO 
projects were on hold.  Now that the economy has gotten better, those 
projects were restarted.  So part of the increase in these two months was 
because of that. . . .  Foreign-related business has not reached a high point.  
Now it is harder for foreign investors to enter the China market, both 
because of the financial crisis and because of the tight financial policies of 
the Chinese government.  Because of the general difficulty in foreign 
investment, foreign law offices are also experiencing a general 
difficulty. . . .  When foreign law firms begin to hire lawyers from 
Chinese firms again, it will demonstrate that they have recovered.
  As a partner in a corporate law firm commented: 
67
In contrast to the dramatic decline and potentially long stagnation of 
corporate work, the financial crisis only modestly affected litigation work.  
The crisis generated more work for domestic law firms, especially smaller 
ones specializing in litigation; labor, debt, and bankruptcy cases increased 
significantly.  But the financial crisis also led to a reduction of clients’ 
properties and investments, which caused a decrease in some law firms’ 
billings, particularly firms specializing in property and real estate disputes.  
As a partner in a small litigation firm noted: 
 
After the financial crisis, our business declined substantially.  The number 
of high-end business [cases] dropped at least 30 percent.  Of course, the 
number of low-end divorce cases did not change.  There were even more 
low-end cases that we did not want to take.  We had to consider the issue 
of cost.  The second half of [2008] was even worse.  Now we can only 
break even between billings and costs.68
Not surprisingly, in criminal cases and ordinary civil cases, clients 
continued to retain lawyers and pay their bills on time.  Two associates in 
two small firms talked about their experiences: 
 
I mainly specialize in criminal matters. . . .  The financial crisis seems to 
have had no affect on our cases.  In litigation, when [the client] wants to 
 
 65. Interview of CF, supra note 57; Interview of CB by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & 
Guangyu Liu (Aug. 13 2009); Interview of CA, supra note 55; Interview of AA, supra note 
53; Interview of DD by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 11, 2009). 
 66. Liu, supra note 1, at 784–89. 
 67. Interview of CB, supra note 65. 
 68. Interview of AA by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 15, 2009). 
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hire a lawyer, they still hire a lawyer. . . .  [There was] also no impact on 
the clients’ payments of our fees.  Most clients continued paying their fees 
on time.69
Our firm was not affected at all, and there seems to be no increase in 
caseload due to the financial crisis either.  In terms of billing, we have 
kept the billing system and did not increase or decrease our rates.
 
70
We only found one exception in ordinary litigation work during our 
interviews—divorce work.  The firm director at a sole proprietorship law 
firm specializing in divorce work told us that because the majority of his 




Similarly, in corporate litigation, no substantive impact from the financial 
crisis was seen.  Although fewer clients retained outside counsel, some 
partners specializing in corporate litigation saw their total billings increase 
more than 20 percent from 2008 to 2009.
  Clients whose property values plummeted often preferred 
to take the less expensive route and get a divorce through the Civil Affairs 
Bureau, rather than the courts, and other couples attempted to remain 
married and work out their differences rather than getting divorced. 
72  Labor disputes increased, 
usually because of companies’ large-scale layoffs.  Though they 
complained that these cases were often not profitable, some large corporate 
law firms remained involved in these cases.73  Overall, because non-
litigation work declined substantially, the proportion of litigation work 
increased in most corporate law firms, but this was a temporary fluctuation 
rather than a long-term trend.74
B.  Changing Client Relations and Management Models 
 
The financial crisis not only caused business decline and fluctuations, but 
also altered the relationship between law firms and clients in important 
ways.  Clients placed new and greater demands on both the quality and the 
price of law firms’ legal services.  Accordingly, firms and lawyers now pay 
more attention to client needs and satisfaction.  Many lawyers expressed 
concerns with maintaining clients and, at the same time, dealing with 
increasing competition among law firms.75
Now corporations need specialized, individualized service.  All large 
corporations would choose services that are not only usable, but also 
good.  Since the financial crisis, clients’ choices become wider, and they 
are also pickier than before.  This causes difficulties for some of our 
  Two lawyers from the same 
corporate firm elaborated on this issue: 
 
 69. Interview of AB by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 7, 2009). 
 70. Interview of AB by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 6, 2009). 
 71. Interview of AA by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 12, 2009). 
 72. Interview of AA, supra note 60. 
 73. Interview of CF by Xueyao Li & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 12, 2009). 
 74. Interview of CC by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 13, 2009). 
 75. Interview of CB, supra note 65; Interview of CD by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & 
Guangyu Liu (Aug. 13, 2009); Interview of DC by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu 
(Aug. 11, 2009). 
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projects.  We experienced a situation where a client switched to a less 
expensive law firm.  The client did not say they wanted a discount.  Our 
price was relatively fair.  Now clients not only care about the price, but 
also seek good experience and satisfaction.76
The same project, a larger amount of work.  Not only the legal work, but 
also emotional care.  Now we make phone calls to greet our clients from 
time to time, keeping an emotional tie with them.  Now the entire firm is 
like this, from the top to the bottom.
 
77
Smaller firms also took a more proactive attitude toward clients.  Clients 
put greater demands on their lawyers’ ability to solve disputes and provide 
high-quality advice, and lawyers sometimes needed to change their 
litigation strategies and legal opinions to accommodate client demands.  As 
a managing partner explained: 
 
In the context of the financial crisis, lawyers must change their strategies 
in litigation.  I will give a few examples.  For instance, a company is a 
creditor in the financial crisis, but the debtor’s funding chain is easily 
broken, so in this condition, the lawyer should try his best to persuade the 
client to mediate.  [The lawyer] must understand what the client wants, 
and tell the client that 500,000 [yuan] now is more important than 2 
million [yuan] in the future.  Tell the client he needs to give up.  Also, if 
the debtor goes bankrupt, the creditor should give the debtor a chance.  
The lawyer must provide better strategies for the clients.  The financial 
crisis is a chain reaction.  The bankruptcy of some companies would 
break a series of funding chains.  Therefore, when collecting debts, the 
lawyer must move quickly.  This is reflected in many cases we recently 
handled.78
Similarly, corporate lawyers now take on more tasks from the client on a 
given project, even if some tasks are not necessarily legal issues and lack 
“professional purity.”
 
79  Before the crisis, they would simply tell the client 
that other professionals should handle those tasks.80  For the same project, 
the amount of legal research and miscellaneous tasks increased to please the 
client and raise the total billings.  Yet many clients, particularly more 
familiar ones, threatened that if the law firm did not reduce service fees, 
they would switch law firms.81
The clients’ budgets were reduced, so they started bargaining with law 
firms over fees.  No substantive influence in other aspects.  For example, 
they asked for discounts, and would sometimes have a few rounds of 
negotiation.  Sometimes they would not even waste the time.  If they felt 
we were too expensive they would simply go to another firm.
  Lawyers were under more pressure to retain 
clients than ever before.  As a partner described: 
82
 
 76. Interview of CC by Xueyao Li, Ming Li, & Guangyu Liu (Aug. 13, 2009). 
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Despite increased pressure from clients and other law firms, the majority 
of lawyers we interviewed remained optimistic.  Businesses constantly need 
legal services, and the relatively young Chinese corporate law firms used 
the financial crisis to develop more sophisticated mechanisms for client 
management and to diversify their practice areas.  As the managing partner 
of a large corporate firm commented: 
I don’t think this is a predicament.  It depends on whether or not we can 
learn to transform ourselves.  For example, when affected by the financial 
crisis, our team switched from capital markets to banking.  Now that 
capital markets are getting better, we are switching back.  We will not 
fail, because as long as our clients are there, and large companies and 
large enterprises . . . do not fail, we will survive.83
The financial crisis changed law firm management in ways other than 
client relations.  Many firms began employing new strategies for cost 
control, personnel management, and teamwork to adapt to the challenges of 
a stagnant market—namely, reducing administrative costs and the number 
of legal assistants.  A partner in a large corporate firm explained the 
changes in the firm’s management: 
 
The financial crisis inevitably led to the death of [firms] that could not 
control their costs.  Since the financial crisis, we have made progress in 
controlling costs.  We have become stronger, with better quality of 
management, and removed much “redundant meat.”  Now, everyone has 
their own responsibilities.  Of course, the redundant [staff] were mostly 
[legal] assistants.  We changed from loose management to frugal 
management.  For example, we used to give every lawyer a desktop 
[computer], and the repair cost was very high.  Now we use a server to 
centralize the control and repair of computers.84
Given that the Chinese legal services market grew at a remarkable rate 
for over a decade, few senior partners in Chinese law firms fully grasped 
the importance of retaining clients and improving firm management.  The 
financial crisis was their first major experience with a stagnant market.  For 
many of them, it was a learning experience that may be beneficial to them 
in the long run.  As the managing partner in a large firm explained: 
 
We have always emphasized controlling costs.  After the financial crisis, 
we considered some suggestions, but did not take any major action.  The 
financial crisis had a big impact on us, but because our firm is large, our 
cash flow was sufficient.  Even in the worst months of March and April 
[2009], we did not cut expenses.  The operating costs of law firms mainly 
include rent, employee salaries, and taxes.  Our firm did not reduce rent or 
fire people. . . .  At the end of [2008] we considered laying off people and 
reducing office space, but as a corporate law firm, we needed some 
reserves in personnel.  [We] would not do anything shortsighted.  We 
would cut costs only if it really had an impact on the firm’s daily 
operation.85
 
 83. Interview of AA, supra note 
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 85. Interview of CB, supra note 65. 
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C.  Work and Life of Lawyers 
The most significant impact of the financial crisis was the unprecedented 
number of lawyer layoffs in both foreign and domestic corporate law firms.  
Most foreign law offices and top domestic corporate firms had grown 
continuously since the Chinese corporate legal market’s formation in the 
early 1990s, sometime doubling or tripling in size in merely three to four 
years.  The financial crisis marked the first time in the history of the 
Chinese legal profession that large-scale lawyer layoffs occurred. 
Domestic and foreign firms used different methods for downsizing their 
offices.  Massive layoffs mainly occurred in foreign law offices; many of 
them significantly reduced their headcount, and most of them stopped 
hiring new lawyers.  Additionally, the massive flow of lawyers from 
domestic to foreign firms came to a sudden halt.  In contrast, in most 
domestic law firms, the scales of layoffs were far more modest.  Many 
firms significantly reduced their annual bonuses and asked their lawyers to 
work in shifts or use flexible work hours, but the lawyers kept their jobs.  
Only a relatively small number of lawyers permanently lost their jobs.86
One reason that partners resisted the pressure to downsize is they 
believed it would damage the firm’s collegiality and morale.  Senior 
partners mainly belong to their firm’s founding generation and thus they 
often have a more collegial and personal relationship with associates than 
those seen in large Anglo-American law firms, most of which have grown 
into global corporate entities that follow institutionalized rules.  As one 
lawyer commented, “China is building a harmonious society, so we are also 
trying to build a harmonious law firm.”
 
87
More important, domestic law firms chose to retain their lawyers despite 
the sharp drop in business because most partners expected the Chinese 
market to recover quickly—and they were correct.  Unlike the seemingly 
long process of economic stagnation in many Western countries, the 
Chinese economy continued growing despite the financial crisis.  
Accordingly, most lawyers working in domestic firms retained their 
positions.  However, other than one large generalist firm, all law firms 
where we conducted interviews stopped hiring new lawyers and staff.  Only 
the top law school graduates could find jobs or even internship 
opportunities in the year after the financial crisis.
  Under the influence of both the 
traditional Confucian harmonious culture and the government policy of 
maintaining social stability, the domestic law firms’ approach when facing 
the market pressure was evidently softer than that of many international law 
firms. 
88  Many lawyers who 
were laid off by foreign law firms found it difficult to obtains jobs with 
domestic firms unless they accepted a significant salary reduction.89
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the beginning of the new recruitment season in October 2009, most 
domestic law firms began hiring once again, and found themselves in an 
excellent position to attract top talent.  It remains unclear, however, to what 
extent foreign law firms have resumed hiring. 
Even though most domestic firms worked hard to retain their lawyers, the 
lawyers, especially junior associates, still felt increased pressure in the 
months after the global financial crisis hit.  An associate in the Shanghai 
office of a large corporate firm headquartered in Beijing described his 
feelings at the time: 
We still feel much pressure.  On TV we saw that many people working 
for foreign companies were laid off.  [I] often heard that my classmates 
working in foreign [law] firms were fired.  At that time our office had [no 
work] for two to three months.  Every day, when I came to the office, if 
the boss asked me to his office, I always felt scared—[I worried] “am I 
being fired?”90
An associate in a different firm echoed this feeling: 
 
The psychological pressure was real.  The general environment was like 
that.  Seeing or hearing other law firms laying off people, of course [I] 
would have psychological pressure. . . .  I heard that there was a female 
lawyer at a law firm who was laid off and could not find a job for several 
months.91




Meanwhile, given their lack of work, law firms created professional 
development programs for associates, as an associate reported: 
 
Our firm created many training programs, for example, trainings on legal 
English and legal documents for junior and mid-level associates.  Such 
trainings were usually on Friday.  When we had free time, our team would 
do some group discussions, summarizing previous projects, et cetera.  
This is perhaps a positive effect of the financial crisis.93
Our research did not show any significant gender difference in terms of 
losing jobs or salary reductions.  The Chinese legal profession is more 




In our firm there is no difference between men and women.  There are 
more female lawyers, about two-thirds.  On my team there are more 
women than men, and more men lost their jobs [during the financial 
 but our interviews suggest that, even in the face of the economic 
downturn, female lawyers were as competitive as their male colleagues in 
corporate law firms.  As a female associate explained her experience: 
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crisis] than women.  The partners considered the gender balance issue and 
leaned toward males in recruitment, but the most important thing is still 
the professional expertise.95
The impact of the crisis on lawyers extended further than simply keeping 
or losing their jobs.  While many lawyers, particularly junior associates in 
large corporate law firms, reported that they were more cautious in their 
daily spending and financial planning,
 
96 those specializing in litigation did 
not significantly alter their behavior, and several lawyers even indicated 




The data and analysis presented in this Essay leads to four general 
conclusions.  First, the legal profession’s social structure98
Has the Chinese legal services market fully recovered from the financial 
crisis?  Given that few Chinese law firms performed large-scale layoffs, and 
most firms have resumed their regular practices, the general answer is 
probably “yes.”  But it is also clear that the market is still far from 
recovering to its peak levels of the mid-2000s.  As one of our interviewees 
indicated, only when foreign law offices recover their business and begin 
hiring again will the Chinese corporate legal market continue its progress in 
the process of globalization.  We do not yet have empirical data to explore 
this aspect of the market change, but the fact that no international law office 
in China closed, even during the worst days of the financial crisis, gives 
hope to lawyers practicing in this new and fast developing market for legal 
services. 
 mediated the 
impact of the financial crisis, i.e., the personal hemisphere experienced far 
less business decline and fluctuation than the corporate hemisphere.  
Second, law firms’ strategies in dealing with the economic downturn 
depended upon their practice focus as well as their internal partner-associate 
relations.  Firms with more generalist practice, stronger collegiality, and 
more teamwork were less likely to adopt drastic measures to reduce costs 
and downsize offices.  Third, the financial crisis strengthened client 
influence on legal practice, particularly in corporate law firms, with more 
clients preferring to use in-house counsel and tightly controlling their 
budgets for legal services.  Finally, the financial crisis caused a shift in the 
direction of law firms’ learning processes—local firms tend to become 
more innovative and less mimetic in an economic downturn than in an 
economic boom. 
With an increasing number of Chinese lawyers returning from receiving 
their education abroad, mostly in the United States and the United 
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Kingdom,99 the supply of lawyers with expertise in international business 
transactions is likely to exceed law firms’ demands in the near future.  This 
might have an unintended “spill over” effect on the overall work quality and 
business orientation of the Chinese legal profession, as lawyers move from 
international law offices and top-tier Chinese firms to lower-tier firms.  Yet 
this learning process of global legal expertise also has a limit—to what 
extent the global training and experience would affect the personal 
hemisphere as it did in the corporate hemisphere100
Finally, for international law firms seeking to pierce the national barrier 
of legal practice in China, now the process will probably take a longer 
period of time than the common expectation before the financial crisis.  As 
Chinese law firms grow bigger, they have also become more specialized, 
profitable, and even international.  Accordingly, it is increasingly difficult 
for the much smaller foreign law offices in mainland China to merge with 
them, even if the Chinese government would permit such mergers.  In a 
sense, the financial crisis has added another layer of unpredictability to the 
mysterious future of the Chinese legal services market, and we can only 
wait to see how foreign and domestic law firms learn from each other and 
produce the new shapes of the legal profession in the age of globalization. 
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